Supreme
Court Rules ADA's Direct Threat Defense Applies To Job
That Poses Risks To Employee - submitted by Art Silbergeld, Proskauer
Rose LLP
In Chevron
U.S.A. v. Echazabal, No. 00-1406, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4202 (S. Ct. June
10, 2002), the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that an employer
does not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)
when it refuses to hire a disabled worker on the grounds that the job
would pose a direct threat to the employee's own health. In so ruling,
the Court reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit which had held that while an employer could exclude a
worker who posed a direct threat to others in the workplace, it could
not exclude a worker who posed a threat only to his/her own health or
safety.
In 1972, Mario Echazabal began working for an independent contractor
at a Chevron-owned oil refinery in California. During the next 20 years,
Echazabal worked almost continuously there. Twice, he applied to work
directly for Chevron and was offered a position contingent on passing
a physical examination. During the exams, Chevron's doctors found that
Echazabal had liver abnormalities, which were ultimately determined
to have been caused by Hepatitis C. Each time, Chevron withdrew the
job offer reasoning that Echazabal's liver condition would be aggravated
by exposure to toxins at the refinery. The second time Echazabal failed
the physical exam, Chevron asked the contractor to remove him from the
refinery or reassign him to a position where he would not be exposed
to chemicals. As a result, in 1996, Echazabal lost his job.
Echazabal sued, claiming that Chevron violated the ADA when it withdrew
the job offer and prevented him from working in the refinery because
of his disability (liver condition). In its defense, Chevron argued
that the ADA permitted qualification standards that are job-related
and consistent with business necessity. One such standard, set forth
in the ADA's text, was that the disabled individual “not pose a
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace”
which could not be cured by a reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. §
12113(a), (b). Since, by regulation, the EEOC had expanded that defense,
permitting employers to establish qualification standards, tests, or
selection criteria that screen out disabled individuals who posed “a
direct threat to the health or safety of the individual or others in
the workplace,” the district court granted Chevron summary judgment.
On appeal, although Chevron argued that a job in its refinery would
pose a “direct threat” to Echazabal's health, the Ninth Circuit
reversed, reasoning that ADA's text said nothing about a threat to a
disabled employee's (or applicant's) health, instead limiting the defense
to the “health or safety of other individuals in the workplace”
(emphasis added).
Reversing the Ninth Circuit, a unanimous Supreme Court sustained EEOC's
regulation as a reasonable interpretation of the direct threat defense.
Thus, the high Court explained, the textual definition of the ADA's
“qualification standards” defense (set forth at 42 U.S.C.
§12113(b)) actually suggested expansiveness as it states the defense
“may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace”
(emphasis added). The statute, therefore, was not exclusionary as Echazabel
suggested and the Ninth Circuit had ruled. The Court reasoned “[t]he
EEOC was certainly acting within the reasonable zone when it saw a difference
between rejecting workplace paternalism and ignoring specific and documented
risks to the employee himself, even if the employee would take his chances
for the sake of getting a job.” Id. at *23. In addition, the Court
noted that a ruling for Echazabal would mean “trouble” for
employers seeking to comply with the ADA and other health and safety
statutes, such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”)
which requires that employers furnish each and every worker with a place
of employment free from recognized hazards which may cause death or
serious physical harm to employees. EEOC's interpretation , therefore,
was not only textually reasonable but it also filled a void, preventing
needless litigation involving the ADA and OSHA statutes that the courts
would have been otherwise asked to resolve.
Noting that the EEOC regulation requires that an employer make a “particularized
inquiry into the harms the employee would probably face,” the Court
dismissed the idea that the regulation smacked of workplace paternalism
that the ADA was designed to outlaw. Rather, the Court cautioned employers
that “[t]he direct threat defense must be 'based on a reasonable
medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or
the best available objective evidence,' and upon an expressly 'individualized
assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the
essential functions of the job,' reached after considering, among other
things, the imminence of the risk and the severity of the harm portended.”
Id. at *23 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)). In so stating, the
high Court emphasized the significant burden employers confront in utilizing
this affirmative defense.
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